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Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment
Program under Asymmetric Information
JunJie Wu and Bruce A. Babcock
Green payment programs, where the government pays farmers directly for environmental
benefits, are an alternative to the current method of achieving environmental benefits which
restricts farming practices in exchange for deficiency payments. This article presents a
voluntary green payment program using the principles of mechanism design under asym-
metric information. Information asymmetry arises because the government knows only the
distribution of farmers' production situations, rather than farm-specific information. The
program is demonstrated with irrigated corn production in the Oklahoma high plains. A green
payment program can reduce budget costs and pollution, while increasing the net social
value of corn production.
Key words: asymmetric information, environmental benefits, green payment, mechanism
design, stewardship programs
Introduction
Environmental benefits offered by U.S. farmers have been purchased primarily by making
eligibility for subsidies conditional on compliance with conservation practices. To remain
eligible for subsidies, farmers cannot drain wetlands or till previously untilled land, and they
must adopt and follow conservation measures that reduce soil erosion. The private cost of
providing these environmental benefits is less than the subsidies, consequently, there are
continued high participation rates in U.S. farm commodity programs. However, if recent
trends of reduced agricultural subsidies continue, the cost of meeting environmental restric-
tions will eventually be greater than the subsidies, and government will need to find a new
mechanism to purchase environmental benefits from farmers. Tighter federal budgets are
not likely to support both current commodity programs and programs to offset their
detrimental environmental effects (Kuch).
An alternative to current programs is to pay farmers directly for the environmental
benefits they provide. Such an alternative has been called a "green payment" or "environ-
mental stewardship" program. A workable green payment program must overcome at least
three potential problems. (a) A viable program must recognize that farmers often have more
information about their own site-specific resource setting than does the government. That
is, possible information asymmetries must be accounted for. (b) The program should
continue the tradition of being voluntary. And (c) the links connecting production decisions,
site-specific resource settings, the resulting pollution, and pollution damage must all be
known.
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This article assumes that the last problem has been successfully overcome and develops
a green payment program that overcomes the first two difficulties by applying the principles
of mechanism design under asymmetric information. These principles were developed by
Mirrlees; Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin; Myerson; Harris and Townsend; Baron and
Myerson; Guesnerie and Laffont; and Chambers (1989). Previous applications to agricul-
tural policy analysis include Lewis, Feenstra, and Ware, who analyzed the reorganization of
subsidized industries under asymmetric information, and Chambers (1992), who examined
the motivations underlying the choice of agricultural policy mechanisms. This study extends
previous analyses by explicitly considering the environmental consequences of agricultural
production. The motivation for this work is to show how it is possible to increase the
efficiency with which environmental benefits are obtained from agriculture with targeted
payments.
The Model
This study uses a principal-agent model to design the green payment program. Principal-
agent models have been used to model situations where information asymmetries are
important. Perhaps the most straightforward example is the relationship between stockhold-
ers of a firm (the principal) and the firm's management (the agent). Management has more
firm-level production and marketing information than individual stockholders so there is a
risk that management could take actions that work in its favor rather than in the interest of
stockholders. Stockholders, therefore, can increase their expected returns by designing
contracts with built-in incentives that induce management to take actions that maximize the
value of the firm. Such a contract induces the agent (farmers) to adopt production practices
that maximize net social welfare, which is the objective of the principal (the public).
The green payment program presents farmers with a policy menu that consists of
combinations of the type of production practices allowed (e.g., input use and tillage
practices) and a corresponding government payment. The menu can specify as many
combinations as there are distinct resource settings. Participation is voluntary; thus, farmers
may choose any combination or none of them. In developing the green payment program,
the asymmetry of information between the government and producers plays an integral role
in program design. We assume that although the government knows all possible resource
settings, it cannot identify each individual farmner's resource setting. As Chambers (1992)
points out, even if the government can identify individual farmers' resource settings, political
pressures may preclude using this knowledge as the overt basis for policy formulation. For
example, the 1992 National Resources Inventory (NRI) identifies production practices and
resource settings for more than 800,000 nonfederal locations. Soil profile properties at each
location can be identified by linking the 1992 NRI to the SOILS5 database. This linked
database would be ideal for policy formulation; however, privacy considerations preclude
the government from revealing the longitude and latitude of the NRI points. Given this
information asymmetry, farmers may have an incentive to misrepresent their resource
settings to obtain favorable combinations of production practices and payments. The
program is designed to induce farmers to report their true resource settings. Thus, the
program is second best because of this constraint.
Producers of an agricultural commodity are differentiated by their resource endowment.
For simplicity assume that there are two groups of producers. The analysis can be extended
in a straightforward manner to N groups of producers. Producers in group 1 have lower
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quality lands than producers in group 2. That is, for a given level of input use, producers in
group 1 always have a lower crop yield and a smaller marginal product of input than
producers in group 2. The two groups may also differ in terms of the impacts of their
production activities on environmental quality. Assume that the government knows that there
are two groups of producers, but it cannot identify to which group an individual producer
belongs. Furthermore, assume that each producer knows his or her own group. Thus,
information is asymmetric between the government and farmers.
Let x represent per acre input levels, with x,0 indicating the production practices on farm
type i without government involvement. The corresponding per acre net return and pollution
level, ? i(Xio) and zi(xio), are
(1) r i(xo ) = pf;(Xo )- wx,i, and
(2) Zi (XiO) = gi(xio ),
where .f(.) and g (.) are the production and pollution functions for producers in group i, and
p and w are the output and input prices. Let x, denote the production practices that maximize
the social value of production in type i farms. That is, x,, is defined by:
(3) pf((xe) - w - tg'(xic) = 0,
where t is the social cost per unit of pollution. If these production practices are adopted,
income for producers in group i will be i (xi ). The resulting pollution level is z (x,,).
Under full information a regulation that directs type i farms to use production practice
xi would be socially optimal. But often the government does not have enough farm-level
information of funds to achieve this degree of regulation. Relying on farmers to report their
true resource base may cause incentive compatibility problems as farmers attempt to
maximize the sum of government and market returns, which is inconsistent with the
government's intention of maximizing the sum of private and public gains. In addition, direct
regulation runs counter to the tradition of voluntary farm programs.
Under the green payment program the government presents farmers with a policy menu:
(x,, si), i = 1, 2, where x, is the production practices intended for farm type i, and s, is the per
acre payment from the government if x, is chosen. The program should be designed so that
producers have no incentive to choose the option intended for the other group. Specifically,
(xi,, s) must be the optimal choice for producers in group i. This constraint is often referred
to as the self-selection or incentive compatibility constraint in the mechanism design
literature. A policy menu (xi, s,) (i = 1, 2) is self-selecting if:
(4) 7i1 (xi)+s, > n I(x2)+s2 , and
(5) 7t 2(X 2 )+ S2 2 72 (X)+ S
The self-selection constraints require that producers of each group prefer the policy option
intended for them to the option intended for the other group.
The self-selection constraints imply that
n (x 2 )-ni 1 (Xi)< I 2 (x2 )-n 2 (x!), or
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(7) ;(X2) -. fl (x) < f2(X2)- f(x).
Because 8fJ / Ox < af2 / ax for any x, (7) implies that x2 2 x, .That is, producers with more
productive land must be allowed to use at least the same level of inputs as producers with
less productive land. Similar results have been derived in Guesnerie and Seade, Weymark,
and Chambers (1992). Both self-selection constraints bind, if and only if,Jf (x 2 ) - f (x,) =
f2 (x 2 ) -. f2 (x ). Thus, unless x, = x2, only one self-selection constraint can bind and at least
one group strictly prefers its policy option to the one intended for the other group. In this
case, the inequalities in (6) and (7) hold strictly, and the policy is truly self-selecting. When
x, = x 2, (4) implies s, > s 2, and (5) implies s2 > s. Hence s, = s2. Thus, both groups receive
the same policy and are "bunched." Chambers (1992) and Guesnerie and Seade have shown
that with only two groups bunching is not optimal if the government's objective depends on
the payment level si.
To induce producers to participate the green payment program must satisfy individual
rationality constraints. Farmers cannot be worse off participating than if they choose not to
participate:
(8) 7t (x 1)+ S >27i(x 0I), and
(9) n 2(x2 )+ S2 > 2 (X20 ).
A green payment program is feasible if it satisfies equations (4), (5), (8), and (9). When the
government uses a feasible program, farmers voluntarily choose the policy option intended
for them.
The government's problem is to find a feasible program that maximizes its objective
function. Assume that the government wishes to maximize social surplus from agricultural
production. Given the policy menu (x,, s,) (i = 1,2), social value of production for farm type
i, o),(xi), is
(10) o i(xi) = Pf(xi)-wxi -tgi(xi) = i (xi)- tg(xi),
and social surplus from production is
(11) (i (Xi, Si) = Co(X) - Xsi,
where X is the marginal deadweight cost of raising tax revenue to support the government
payment. The government's problem can be formally stated as:
2
(12) max Ai[n i(x) - tg i(x i ) - Xsi],
x, si j
s.t. (4), (5), (8), and (9),
where A, is the total acreage on the ith type farms.
The Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions for the maximization problem (Wu and Coppins)
are
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(13) xI {Al [r i(x, )- tg (x,)]+ ,u[ri (x, )- 2]n (Xl)+ +L3 i ( I)} = 0,
(14) x2 {A2 [e2n (x2)- tg2(x2)]- tc ,(x2)+ [L 2z2 (x2)+ a47n2(x2)} = 0,
(15) s1[-XA, + ti -u2 + J 3] 0,
(16) s 2 [-XA2 - Il + p2 + 4] =0,
(17) ,[[rc(x2,)-rcI(Xl)-XS I +s2]= 0,
(18) [2172(XI)-- 7 2(X2)+S I -S2]=0,
(19) I3[7 Il(xIO)- 7 I(x 1)- Sl]= 0, and
(20) [(x20)-- 2(X2) - - s2] = 0,
where pj/ > 0 (j 1, 2, 3, 4) are the Lagrange multipliers for the four constraints in (12).
The solution to the government's problem, (x, s) (i = 1, 2), satisfies equations (13) to (20).
Let us first analyze the properties of the optimal policy menu (x, s* )(i = 1,2), when
X X 0. If x, < x, for i = 1, 2, then both s1 and s2 must be positive to satisfy the individual
rationality constraints. Since "bunching" is not optimal in this case (see discussion above),
only one self-selection constraint can bind. So, either Ha, = 0 or pt2 = 0. Equations (15) and
( 16) then indicate that if both s1 and s2 are positive only the following situations are possible:
(1) P1 = P2 =0, ° 3 = M3l, = ,4 = A2; (2) li = |4 = 0, 2 I=  2,
=3 = k(A, + A2); (3) =2  3 = 0, P = A, 14 = X(A, + A2);
(4)only, tI =0; and (5)only i2 = 0.
In all these situations, at least one individual rationality constraint is binding.
In situation 1, both individual rationality constraints are binding because
Ct3 > 0 and 1i4 > 0. As a result, both groups of producers are indifferent between the green
payment program and no program. Substituting p (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) into (13) and (14) gives
t(21) n7r(x,)-- g(x,)=0, and
1+%
(22) 2 (x,2) - g2 (X2)= 0.
A comparison of equations (21) and (22) with equation (3) indicates that when opportunity
costs of government spending are considered, the level of input use is determined as if the
social cost per unit of pollution is [t / (I + X)]. The opportunity cost of government spending
decreases the importance of externality costs in determining optimal input use. This result
reflects the tradeoff between the externality costs of pollution and the costs of raising
government payments. The more input use is allowed, the larger the externality costs will
be, but the social costs to raise government payments are smaller because lower payments
320 December 1995
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are needed. Thus, if X > 0, x, < x,, i = 1, 2. Equations (21) and (22) also show that as long
ast>0, x, <x,0, i =1,2.
In situation 2, only the individual rationality constraint for group 1 is binding. This
implies that producers in group 2 are better off than without any farm programs, while
producers in group 1 are indifferent to participating in the program and having no program
at all. In this situation, equations (13) and (14) can be simplified to:
(23) Al [n(x )-tg (x )]- A2inc (x )+ h(Al + A2 ) (x ) = 0, and
t(24) 2(x2)- (2 x)= 0.I+L
Equation (24) indicates that optimal production practices for group 2 are the same as in
situation 1. So x,, < x 2 < x20. Let h(x,) denote the left-hand side of (23). When the
second-order sufficient conditions are satisfied, h'(x)<O0 (see Wu and Coppins, pp.
449-50). Since h(xl) = 0 and h(xo) = -tAgX(xlo)- tA2n (xlo) <0, x4 must be less than
xl0. However, since h(xi ) = -kA2n(xi) + (Al + A2 )cl (xI,) may be greater or less than
zero, we cannot determine whether xI is greater or less than Xle. When h(x,,) 0 or
(Al + A2)n (xl,) > A2 t n (Xle), then xle < x, otherwise, xle > xl. This result reflects the
trade off between two factors. First, because the individual rationality constraint for group
1 is binding, allowing this group to use more input than xle would reduce the government
payment and the social cost of raising tax revenue. Second, because the self-selection
constraint for group 2 is binding, allowing group 1 to use more input would force the
government to pay more to group 2, otherwise, group 2 would choose the menu intended
for group 1. When the first factor outweighs the second factor, xle < x , otherwise, the
government would prescribe production practices that are more restrictive than the first-best
ones.
Situation 3 is symmetric to situation 2 except that x, < xi holds for both groups, in which
case, equations (13) and (14) can be simplified to:
t(25) 7 (x )-L g'(x )=0, and
(26) A2 [ 2(x2 )-tg2 (x 2 )]- XA17; (x 2 )+ (Al + A2 )72 (x 2 ) = 0.
Equation (25) indicates that optimal production practices for group 1 are the same as in
situation 1. So, xle < xl < x 0. Let k(x 2) denote the left-hand side of (26). When the second-
order sufficient conditions are satisfied, k'(x 2)<0 (see Wu and Coppins, pp. 449-50).
Since k(x) = 0, and k(x 2e) = -LAn l(X2 ) + X(Al + A2 )n 2(x2() - = ,Al[f2(x2 )- fi'(X2e)]
+An 2; (X2e) > 0, X2 must be greater than x2,
In situation 4, both individual rationality constraints bind. Thus, all producers are
indifferent to participating in the program and having no program at all. Situation 4 is the
same as situation 2 except that the individual rationality for group 2 is also binding. As in
situation 2, it can be shown that x2e < x < x20 and x < x 0, however, xl may be greater
or less than x, depending on the trade off between social costs of pollution and the efficiency
losses of raising government payments. Similarly, it can be shown that situation 5 is the same
Wu, Babcock
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as situation 3 except that the individual rationality for group 1 is also binding. As in situation
3, xi < x, is always true for both groups.
Now let us examine the properties of the optimal policy menu when X =0. In this
situation, the government's problem can be simplified to:
2
(27) max Ai [n i(xi) - tgi (x i)],
Xi i=I
(28) s.t. n,(x2)-71n(Xi)<72(x2)-n72(x).
Given the input level x, from this maximization problem, sl and s2are selected to satisfy
(29) 7l(X2)-n7l(x ) <S -S 2 <•; 2(X2)-n 2(X ), and
(30) 7r i(x ) + s i > n i(xio) for i = 1, 2.
The first-order conditions for the maximization problem in (27) are
(31) A[ (x,)- tg(x )]-r[(x, )-7 (x,)] = 0,
(32) A2 [ (2)- tg(2 )] - [7(X2)- (X 2 )] = 0, and
(33) r[n , (72) -,l(X)- 72(x2)+ 72(xl)] = 0
where 1r > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint in (28). If 1r = 0, then equations
(31) and (32) indicate that x; = x, for i = 1, 2. Since producers with high quality land must
be allowed to use more input, it must be true that xI = xl < x2 = x2e. Furthermore, it can
be shown that xi, < x2 is also the sufficient condition for x, = x,, i = 1, 2. In fact, when
Xe, < x2e, one can always choose s, and s2 close and large enough so that they satisfy both
(29) and (30). Since (29) implies incentive compatibility and (30) implies individual
rationality, the socially optimal level of input use can be implemented. Thus, '1 = 0 if and
only if x, < x2,.
If 19 > 0 or xl, > x 2(, then (33) indicates that both self-selection constraints are binding.
Thus, xl = x2 - x . From (29) we can see that s* = s2 = s . This implies that when X = 0,
bunching may be optimal. Substituting xl = x2 into (31) and (32) and adding them
together, we get A [7e i(x) -tg (x )] + A2[n (x)- tg(x )]= 0.
To summarize, if X 0, then x, < x, < xio for i = 1, 2. This implies that when there are
deadweight losses associated with green payments, the government should prescribe pro-
duction practices that are less restrictive than first-best practices. The exception occurs when
the self-selection constraint for the producers with high quality land is binding. In this case,
the government may have to prescribe production practices that are more restrictive than the
first-best ones for producers with low quality land in order to satisfy incentive compatibility.
If X = 0, then the following policy menu is optimal in the sense that it satisfies the
incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints and maximizes social surplus
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from agricultural production. (a) If X2e xe, farmers are given three options:
(XI,, SI ), (X2c, S2 ), or no participation, where s I and s 2 are selected to satisfy
71it(X2e)-- I(XIl)<S - < 7t 2 (X2 ) - 2(Xle )
7ri(xie)+ Si >i(xio) for i = 1,2.
In this case, producers in group i will voluntarily choose (xie, s ), and the green payment pro-
gram becomes a first-best policy. (b) If x 2, < x,,, farmers are given two options: (x*, s*) or
no participation, where x* is defined by A [c(x*)- tgf(x*)]+A 2 [n (x*)-tg(x*)]=0,
ands satisfies 7i (x*)+ s*Ž > n i(xj,) for i = 1,2.
When x2e > xl, = 0, the optimal policy is to idle land on type 1 farms. Such a land
retirement program that enrolls the least expensive land first would satisfy incentive
compatibility and therefore would result in the correct land being enrolled. However, if
xl, > x, = 0, that is, high quality land is also much more vulnerable to pollution than low
quality land, then the socially optimal policy would be to idle land on type 2 farms. A land
retirement program that first enrolls least expensive land will not be incentive compatible:
farmers would have the incentive to misrepresent their environmental attributes. In fact,
without appropriate procedures to establish the eligibility for participation, such programs
would end up enrolling lands on type 1 farms.
A Green Payment Program for Irrigated Corn Production
Implementing the green payment program requires extensive information about resource-
specific production functions for crops and pollution, the marginal cost of pollution, and the
marginal social cost of taxes. Here we use technical information on irrigated corn production
(and nitrogen pollution) in the Oklahoma high plains reported by Wu, Mapp, and Bernardo.
We construct green payment contracts to promote the adoption of efficient production
practices.
The study region is mostly upland plains with a semiarid climate. Annual precipitation
is about 19 inches. Richfield clay loam, Ulysses clay loam, Dalhart fine sandy loam, and
Dalhart loamy fine sands are the four principal cropland soil types in the region (Bernardo
et al.). Because of data limitations, we only consider nitrate water pollution in designing the
green payment program. A comprehensive analysis should consider other environmental
indicators (e.g., soil erosion) and pollutants (e.g., pesticides) as well. To make the steward-
ship program enforceable, we choose production practices that are observable. Specifically,
we let x represent alternative irrigation systems (including no crop production).
Corn accounts for less than 2% of cropland in this region but more than 10% of nitrogen
loss in runoff and leaching (Wu et al.). According to the 1987 National Resources Inventory
(U.S. Department of Agriculture), about 71% of corn is grown on clay loam soil and 29%
on fine sandy loam soil. Because all corn acres are irrigated, no corn is grown on loamy fine
sand. Clay loam soil is more suitable to corn production and less vulnerable to nitrogen
runoff and leaching than fine sandy loam soil (Bernardo et al.; Petr and Bremer). Thus, corn
producers are divided into two groups: group 1 with clay loam soils and group 2 with fine
sandy loam soils.
Richfield clay loam and Dalhart fine sandy loam are selected to represent clay loam and
fine sandy loam soils. Production and pollution functions for corn on these two soil types
are taken from Wu, Mapp, and Bernardo as are estimates of water application costs, nitrogen
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Table 1. A Comparison of Outcomes under the Current, First-Best, and Stewardship Corn
Programs for the Oklahoma Panhandle
Current Program First-Best Program Stewardship Program
Variables Claya Sandya Clay Sandy Clay Sandy Clay
Production practices:
Nitrogen (Ibs./ac.) 224.00 213.00 204.00 0 197.00 0 204.00
Water (in./ac.) 19.00 20.00 18.00 0 16.50 0 18.00
Irrigation system Fur Spr Spr 0 Spr - Spr
Yield (bu./ac.) 207.00 200.00 209.00 0 207.00 0 209.00
Nitrogen loss (Ibs./ac.):
Runoff 14.78 4.39 2.53 0 2.49 0 2.53
Leaching 0.95 3.17 0.30 0 0.23 0 0.30
Net return ($/ac.) 73.70 51.60 82.50 0 82.00 0 82.50
Gov. payments ($/ac.) c 48.90 45.50 49.80 0 0 52.0 d 1.00d
Farm income ($/ac.) 122.60 97.10 130.30 0 82.00 52.0 82.50
Opp. costs of gov. pay.:
= 0 48.90 45.50 49.80 0 0 52.0 1.00
X = 0.35 66.00 61.40 67.20 0 0 70.2 1.35
Social costs of pollution
t= $10 157.30 75.60 28.30 0 27.20 0 28.30
Net social surplus:
= 0, t = $10 -83.60 -24.00 54.20 0 54.80 0 54.20
X= 0.35, = $10 -100.70 -39.90 34.80 0 54.80 -18.2 53.85
"Sandy = fine sand loam soils; Clay = clay loam soils.
bSpr = sprinkler systems; Fur = furrow systems.
CA program yield of 105.2 bushels per acre and a deficiency payment of $0.48 per bushel are used in calculating
the government payments (FAPRI).
'Any payment scheme that satisfies s > 51.6, s2>20, and sI-s2 <82.5 will be optimal. The payments specified here
minimize government outlays.
price, irrigation fixed costs, and costs for all other fixed and variable costs for the study
region. The target price, deficiency payment, and program yield for corn in 1994 are from
FAPRI. Using this information, we estimate input use, yields, farm income, nitrogen runoff
and leaching, government payments, and net social surplus for each type of farm under
current commodity programs. The results are reported in the three columns headed "Current
Program" of table 1. All corn on fine sandy loam soil is irrigated using sprinkler systems
and about 35% of corn on clay loam soil is irrigated using furrow systems. Therefore, results
are reported for both sprinkle and furrow irrigation on clay loam soil.
Results under a first-best policy are reported in the columns headed "First-Best Program"
of table 1. These results are derived assuming that government price supports are eliminated
and pollution externalities are internalized. We assume that the social cost per unit of
pollution, t, is $10. For any other value of t, the program can be similarly designed. Under
a first-best policy farmers use less water and nitrogen fertilizer on clay loam soils and would
not grow corn on fine sandy loam soils.
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Results for the green payment program are reported in table 1 for two values of X: A=0.35
and A=0. Alston and Hurd suggest that the marginal deadweight loss of a dollar of U.S.
federal spending is likely between $0.20 and $0.50 so X = 0.35 is assumed. Results for X =
0 are derived for comparison purposes.
Net social surplus under current commodity programs is lower than under a first-best
policy for both soil types. The difference is the result of (a) the deadweight loss from raising
tax revenue to pay for the program, and (b) the lack of incentive for producers to consider
environmental performance in their production decisions. The public good nature of envi-
ronmental performance has created a market failure that results in excessive input use,
production, and pollution. For example, producers using furrow irrigation systems on clay
loam soils would use 15% more water and 14% more nitrogen than efficient levels where
only sprinkler irrigation is used. As a result, total nitrogen losses per acre from runoff and
leaching are 13 pounds more than the efficient level. Net social loss under current programs
increase as the social costs of pollution and efficiency losses of government spending
increase. For example, as X increases from zero to $0.35, net social loss per acre on fine
sandy loam soil increases from $24 to $39.90.
The policy menu presented in table 2 would induce producers with fine sandy loam soils
to idle their land in exchange for a payment of $52 per acre from the government. This
payment is greater than their expected net return from farming of $51.60 per acre if they do
not participate and if they choose sprinkler irrigation for corn production. Therefore, it is in
their interest to choose the no. 1 bundle in table 2, that is, to idle their land in exchange for
a payment of $52 per acre from the government. In practice, the policy menu may require
farmers to grow an alternative crop rather than to idlethe land. n this situation, the payment
will be reduced by the net return from growing the alternative crop. Similarly, producers
with clay loam soils would voluntarily choose sprinkler irrigation in exchange for a
government payment of $1 per acre. The payment levels reported in table 1 are specified to
minimize government outlays. In fact, some producers in this region have already adopted
sprinkler irrigation on clay loam soils even without any government payment. To ensure that
all producers participate the government can simultaneously increase payments to both
groups. A simultaneous increase in payments to both groups will not violate the incentive
compatibility constraint.
Even when A=0, net social surplus under the green payment program is lower than the
efficient level on clay loam soils. This reflects that producers would use more nitrogen and
water than the efficient level because the green payment contract does not restrict nitrogen
and water use. Net social surplus with green payments from corn production on fine sandy
loam soil is negative (-$18.2) when X = 0.35. However, it is still worthwhile to induce these
farmers to idle their land because the current program results in a net social surplus of
-$39.90.
The green payment program would reduce nitrogen runoff and leaching and increase net
social surplus of agricultural production. It would also reduce government spending on farm
programs. Of the 25,063 acres of corn grown in the Oklahoma high plains, 17,795 acres are
grown on clay loam soils (35% is furrow irrigated), and 7,268 acres are grown on fine sandy
loam soils. If all farms participate, the total government payment for this region would be
$1,211,280 under the current programs and $295,731 under the green payment program.
Although farm income under the green payment program is lower than under current
commodity programs, it is at least as high as without any government program, otherwise
farmers would not participate. Adding a farm income constraint to the design of the
stewardship program would increase government payments and reduce program efficiency,
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Table 2. A Policy Menu for Corn Producers in
the Oklahoma High Plains
Production Government Payment
Choice Practice ($/acre)
I Idle land 52
2 Sprinkler irrigation 1
3 No participation 0
but it would not eliminate all the advantages of the green payment program. For example,
when X = $0.35, a green payment program that guarantees that both types of farmers are at
least as well off as under the current commodity program would increase net social surplus
per acre by $5.91 on fine sandy loam soil and $2.67 on clay loam soils relative to the levels
achieved under the current program. In this situation, an additional $46.80 per acre must be
paid to farmers with clay loam soils, and an additional $45.10 per acre would have to be
paid to farmers with fine sandy loam soils. The increased payments increase deadweight
losses from taxation by $16.38 per acre on clay loam soils and by $15.79 per acre on fine
sandy loam soils. As a result of these deadweight losses, net social surplus under green
payments would be reduced to $37.47 per acre on clay loam and to -$33.99 per acre on fine
sandy loam soils, levels which are still $2.67 and $5.91 higher than that under the current
programs on these two types of land. A green payment program that guarantees revenue per
acre is at least 85% of current levels would increase social surplus per acre by $11.01 on
fine sandy loam soils and $9.51 on clay loam soils. In this situation, total government
payments would be $1,102,662, which is 9% lower than under current programs. Thus, a
green payment program can be designed to improve economic efficiency and environmental
performance while simultaneously providing large subsidies to producers.
Conclusions
Current farm programs use both taxes and subsidies to acquire environmental benefits from
producers. Conservation Compliance provisions are the best example of indirect taxes in
that the provisions restrict the choice of farming practices for those producers who farm
highly erodible soils. The best example of the use of subsidies is the Conservation Reserve
Program (especially the last signups) where eligibility for payments is limited to those
producers who farm land that would offer significant environmental benefits if it were not
farmed. In this article we present a green payment program under asymmetric information
that is similar to the Conservation Reserve Program in that subsidies are paid in exchange
for adopting production practices that would reduce environmental pollution. The program
is voluntary and self-selecting, making it a second-best policy.
We design a green payment program for irrigated corn production in the Oklahoma high
plains. In this program, payments are made in exchange for efficient irrigation systems,
which includes the option of no crop production. Replacing current farm programs with the
green payment program could reduce farm program costs, improve environmental perform-
ance, and increase net social surplus from corn production-the larger the social cost of
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pollution and efficiency loss of government spending, the larger the improvements in
economic efficiency and environmental and fiscal performance.
Achieving such improvements may come at the expense of other objectives of farm
programs. For example, the stability of farm commodity prices, farm income, and retail food
prices may decrease without including other policy instruments. A green payment program
could also significantly redistribute farm program payments because payments would be
targeted at purchasing environmental amenities rather than tied directly to production levels.
In addition, there is an enforcement issue. Compliance with the green payment program
designed in this article is not difficult because irrigation systems and crop production are
observable. However, enforcement costs likely would be prohibitive for green payment
programs that attempt to alter directly farmers' applications of fertilizer and pesticides.
Implementable programs must be designed so that observable actions taken by contracting
farmers are adequate to determine compliance.
[Received March 1995; final version received September 1995.]
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